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HOWARD M. KIRSHBAUM
EDWIN S. KAHN*
The Italian mathematician Fibonacci established that there is a sub-
stantial correlation between the world of mathematics and the universe
of music. Howard Kirshbaum has established that there is a substantial
correlation between the harmony of the string quartet and the collegial-
ity of an appellate court. He has also demonstrated that a multifaceted
and diverse legal career is exceptionally good grounding for a trial and
appellate judge.
I first met Howard Kirshbaum when we were both students at
Harvard Law School, class of 1965. In our second year, we both worked
with the Harvard Civil Liberties-Civil Rights Research Bureau. In a
time of great social concern, with the 1964 Civil Rights Act then pend-
ing before Congress and great ferment in the Nation, many law students
regarded their duties to the community as co-extensive with their at-
tempts to master the intricacies of the Uniform Commercial Code or the
Internal Revenue Code. These community-related efforts made courses
such as constitutional law and civil procedure come alive in a way that
was more meaningful and less threatening than the Socratic method so
in vogue at Harvard.
I remember that in 1965, Howard and I were due to take the bar
exam together. That was the summer of the great South Platte Flood in
Denver, and Howard spent a day or two at my apartment downtown
before being able to return to Golden. That was probably the only time
he has been deflected, even temporarily, from his course.
I don't know where Howard clerked that summer, but after gradua-
tion in 1965, he worked for the United States Office of Education, and
then came to Denver and clerked for Federal District (now Tenth Cir-
cuit) Judge William E. Doyle. Judge Doyle has always combined intellect
with compassion and has a natural understanding of human nature.
During the year 1965-1966, Howard Kirshbaum worked with Judge
Doyle on a great variety of cases, and also observed many leading trial
lawyers in that court. Judge Doyle describes Kirshbaum as extremely
conscientious and a perfectionist.
Howard joined a small firm, Tweedy, Mosely, Aley & Young, and
thereafter joined Anthony Zarlengo, a noted trial lawyer, in practice. He
concentrated on general civil litigation. In his private civil practice,
Howard handled constitutional cases, including one which challenged
the constitutionality of the Colorado annexation statute. He also partici-
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pated in cases with such notables as George Creamer, Fred Winner and
John Kane.
Sometime in the late 1960's, I discovered that Howard was a first-
class musician, and that his brother, Ralph, is a world-class cellist. I still
remember hearing Ralph perform in Denver, with Howard as concert-
master, for the Community Arts Symphony. Music has always played an
important role in Howard's life. He and his charming wife, Priscilla,
built a music room onto their home and their children are extensively
involved in music. They are so devoted to music that they even named
their springer spaniels "Fiddler" and "Roundeaux."
Howard joined the Denver District Court bench in 1975, where he
handled criminal, domestic, and civil litigation. His trial court work was
highly regarded by all who appeared before him. In 1980 he was ap-
pointed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, and in 1983 he was ap-
pointed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Howard views the work of the Colorado Supreme Court as really
very different from that of the Colorado Court of Appeals. First, there is
a substantially different mix of cases. More than sixty percent of the
docket in the Colorado Supreme Court involves criminal cases, while the
percentage in the court of appeals is much lower. Second, it is different
writing for six rather than two colleagues. Third, there is a large quan-
tity of administrative work regarding policy decisions affecting the jus-
tice system. In addition to scheduled meetings, there often are
unscheduled items which must be addressed. Thus, the institutional as-
pects of the Colorado Supreme Court require a different mix of skills.
In spite of the demands of a law practice or judgeship, Howard
Kirshbaum has perenially taught courses at various local institutions,
from Metropolitan State college to the University of Denver Law School.
His courses have generally focused on the operation of the adversary
system and decision-making, with careful scrutiny given to how lawyers
and judges operate in practice, and equally important, how they ought
to perform. The "ought" is constantly held by Howard as an ideal
against which we all must be measured. He is always ready to challenge
existing assumptions about the legal system and has an extremely high
standard of expected performance, both for himself and for others.
Howard Kirshbaum has actively worked toward making legal serv-
ices accessible to a wider range of people, especially those of moderate
means. He has been quite active in the Colorado Judicial Institute and
in launching prepaid legal services in Colorado. Much of his time has
been given to assisting the Colorado Bar Association's Committee on
Alternatives to Dispute Resolution.
Howard has been active in this community and has served on the
boards of several public and legal organizations. Additionally, he has a
special interest in educating public school children about our legal sys-
tem. Howard sometimes tells the story of a high school class visiting his
Denver District Court classroom, and one of the students asking
whether it was true that judges wore nothing under their robes. In a
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sense, much of his career has been devoted to exploring what is and
ought to be the "soul behind the uniform."
The cases heard by Judge Kirshbaum while on the Colorado Court
of Appeals were as diverse as Colorado's economic and legal systems.
In Kniffin v. Colorado Western Development Co.,' a developer had promised
more than he ultimately could deliver-a common disease among recre-
ational developers. The controlling issue in the case was the measure of
damages. The trial court held that the developer must pay to a suing
land owner the cost of the promised developments, which included
three lakes stocked for fishing and capable of supporting sailing and
water skiing activities, a road system and other recreational facilities.
The trial court awarded $1.3 million against the developer, which the
court of appeals reversed. Judge Kirshbaum noted that the purpose of
damages in contract cases is to place the non-defaulting party in the po-
sition the party would have enjoyed had the breach not occurred-not
to punish the breaching party. Although Colorado had not previously
determined the measure of damages for failure to construct off-site im-
provements, the court held that the measure of damages was the "dimi-
nution in value of the property purchases"-the sum of $11,000 rather
than the much larger sum awarded by the trial court. Had the trial
court's decision been affirmed, it undoubtedly would have had an in ter-
rorem effect on other developers and impeded economic development in
Colorado. The decision also demonstrated Howard's sensitivity in han-
dling class action cases, as well as statutes of limitation issues.
Less than a year later, Judge Kirshbaum turned his attention to such
varied subjects as the priority of mining claims near Central City, Couch
v. Clifton,2 and creditors' remedies against secured personal property,
Wiley v. Bank of Fountain Valley. 3 In Wiley, the judgment of the trial court
was reversed because the trial judge had failed to submit to the jury the
question of whether the debtor had received notice of the proposed
public sale of a note pledged to secure a debt. Thus, the issue of
whether a deficiency was appropriate upon the completion of the sale
was unresolved. In resolving the interplay of various sections of Colo-
rado Uniform Commercial Code, Judge Kirshbaum showed either that
he clearly remembered what he learned in law school in 1964, or that he
was able to effectively teach himself the Code seventeen years later.
His broad range of cases continued with two notable tort decisions
in late 1981 and 1982. In Van Hoose v. Blueflame Gas, Inc., 4 the court held
that liquified propane gas supplied to a home was an exceptionally dan-
gerous instrumentality, entitling the plaintiffs to an instruction that spe-
cial care, rather than merely reasonable conduct, was required by the
supplier. In addition, the court ruled that plaintiffs should have been
1. 622 P.2d 586 (Colo. App. 1980).
2. 626 P.2d 731 (Colo. App. 1981).
3. 632 P.2d 282 (Colo. App. 1981).
4. 642 P.2d 36 (Colo. App. 1981), aff'd, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984).
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granted leave to amend their complaint to include a strict liability claim,
even though notice of that claim was given only shortly before the trial.
In Greenwell v. Gill,5 Judge Kirshbaum wrote an opinion which held
that an expert witness need not be listed by a plaintiff for a medical mal-
practice case to go forward. The issues involved in this particular case
were lack of informed consent, res ipsa loquitur, and negligence gener-
ally. Judge Kirshbaum pointed out that the plaintiff could call defendant
to the stand and establish her claim in that fashion, thus obviating any
need to list her own expert in the first instance. The opinion also
pointed out that lack of informed consent typically is an issue which may
not require medical testimony.
Although Judge Kirshbaum's more notable opinions, like those of
most appellate judges, are reversals of the trial court rather than affir-
mances, his record of affirmances is extensive. A fairly typical case is
Dupuis v. Charnes,6 in which the court upheld a statute permitting the
revocation of a driver's license after a driver refuses to take a test to
determine the alcohol content of his breath or blood. In this case, the
driver challenged the statute because it did not require an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of his alleged refusal to submit to the test. Judge
Kirshbaum found that the plaintiff had been accorded due process: the
statute contemplated both an allegation by the officer of refusal, and the
opportunity to contest the issue before the hearing officer, and in this
case, a hearing officer had specifically found a refusal by the driver. In
another case involving more complex statutory construction, 7 the court
held, in an opinion written by Justice Kirshbaum, that the vehicular
homicide statute was sufficiently intelligible as to not be vague under the
federal Constitution. He also noted that the definition of a strict liability
offense in Colorado is not characterized by the absence of any mental
state but requires a voluntary act or omission, thus providing a statutory
reconciliation of definitions with well-known criminal law principles.
The court also upheld proximate cause as an appropriate standard for
the determination of criminal responsibility under the vehicular homi-
cide statute.
In a late 1984 case, People v. Rubanowitz,8 Justice Kirshbaum au-
thored an opinion in which a forgery conviction was reversed because
the documents issued and circulated by the defendant were true. Thus,
the court resisted an effort to broaden the forgery statute to include
what might have been charged as theft by deception. On the other
hand, the court affirmed the conviction on other counts and rejected
claims that the information was not specific enough, that an instruction
on child abuse was erroneous, and that the jury had not been properly
selected to be representative of the community.
Another case demonstrating Justice Kirshbaum's versatility was
5. 660 P.2d 1305 (Colo. App. 1982).
6. 668 P.2d I (Colo. 1983).
7. People v. Rostad, 669 P.2d 126 (Colo. 1983).
8. 688 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1984).
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Great Western Sugar Co. v. Jackson Lake Reservoir and Irrigation Co. ,9 in which
he ruled on the complicated interplay between water rights claims, aug-
mentation plans and the rights of stockholders in mutual ditch compa-
nies. If still water runs deep, judicial knowledge must run deeper still.
Justice Kirshbaum's judicial opinions demonstrate an openness to
new ideas and thoughtful consideration which we all seek in a judge.
Combined with his calm temperament and quiet reserve, Justice
Kirshbaum is a powerful figure in whatever he is engaged in, including
the Colorado Supreme Court.
9. 681 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1984).
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